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Between 1862 and 1866, two separate homestead acts became 
law in the United States. Congress passed the first during the 
Civil War, applying to public domain lands primarily in the 
western half of the U.S. The Homestead Act of 1862 allowed 
settlers to claim 160 acres of public domain and receive title 
after a five-year period of residence and improvement. It 
featured other methods to gain title, including preemption and 
cash purchase. Following the war in 1866, the Southern Homestead 
Act opened nearly 47,000,000 acres in Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, although in 80-acre parcels 
and with no preemption clause or ability to commute claims 
through cash purchase.   
Despite the apparent similarities, scholars discuss the 
first far more frequently than the latter and rarely consider 
the two together. To a certain degree, this results from the 
wide range of interests converging on the topic.  Historians of 
the public domain and federal land laws; the early Republican 
Party; the Civil War and Reconstruction; and agriculture all 
publish on at least some aspects of the homestead acts. After a 
brief discussion of the historiography of the Southern Homestead 
Act, I will examine congressional debate regarding its repeal.  
The final section examines the aftermath of repeal and its 
impact on the South and the Plains. I argue that the South 
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became a lumber hinterland to the expanding settlement on the 
Plains, amounting to a huge subsidy for that process.  
Several journal articles published in the 1970s treat the 
Southern Homestead Act of 1866. Two of the articles examine the 
experience of single states, Alabama and Louisiana, highlighting 
the failure of the 1866 law to transfer lands into the hands of 
loyal Whites and freedmen. Two other articles focus on the 
southern act writ large, agreeing that the act was a failure 
with only 4,000 claims patented during its tenure, though 
dissenting on the reasons why.1
One version of the Southern Homestead Act’s failure 
criticizes the plan’s creators for not recognizing the needs of 
freedmen. Christie Farnham Pope recognizes George F. Julian as 
the congressional leader responsible for the act and 
characterizes him as an ardent supporter of settlers with an 
unyielding belief in the efficacy of land holding in creating 
“honest and upright citizens.” However, she argues that Julian 
was in the minority with this view and most congressional 
support came from a desire to punish the South than any attempt 
at republican land reform.  Farnham Pope contends that the bill 
was destined for failure because it was based on two faulty 
premises. The first posited that the South’s entire social 
fabric could be remade by transferring “over one-third of the 
area of but five of the Southern states to Negroes.” The second, 
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fatal flaw was the assumption by legislators that freedmen did 
not significantly differ from whites in the North, and would 
easily pass from former bondsmen had no capital and who were 
forbidden to read or write into prosperous citizens.2
Warren Hoffnagle also offers a different rationale for the 
act, stating “it was conceived with a view to greater economic 
equality for black people.” He lists several factors that doomed 
the plan, including corruption among white administrators, white 
hostility toward blacks, unsuitable and remote lands, and an 
under funded and under staffed Freedman’s Bureau. Hoffnagle 
includes the problem of black poverty and illiteracy as 
contributing factors, but argues that had the act been 
implemented differently, these would have been surmounted.3
Writing in 1940, Paul Wallace Gates considers the South, 
between 1866 and 1876, as “a laboratory for experiments in land 
reform.” Rather than focus on the size of the tracts available 
for homesteading (160 acres under the 1862 law, and 80 acres for 
the 1866), Gates rightly observes that that the key difference 
was in the various ways that settlers could gain title to the 
land. The later act restricted claims to homesteading, and had 
no provisions for purchase of land. He argues convincingly that 
the reason for the Southern Homestead Act’s repeal in 1876 came 
from lumber interests, not from a unified South that sought to 
throw off the yoke of Reconstruction. Furthermore, he contends 
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that after 1876, the timber interests were wildly successful in 
appropriating the public domain in the South, thereby removing 
valuable capital in the form of pine lumber.4
The Compromise of 1877 generally receives credit or blame 
for terminating Reconstruction, depending on your perspective.  
And under the administration of Rutherford B. Hayes, who gained 
the Presidency as a result of that compromise, military rule in 
the South did end. However, even before the controversial 
election of 1876, there were signs of a new attitude about the 
former states of the Confederacy. The repeal of the Southern 
Homestead Act was one such event. Congress debated the measure 
for nearly six months before it was sent to President Ulysses S. 
Grant, where it became law without his signature. A close 
examination of those debates reveals that the re-integration of 
the South contained conflicting visions of the nation’s future. 
First introduced in the Senate by Republican Powell Clayton 
from Arkansas, Senate Bill No. 2 opened the public lands in 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi to public 
sale and preemption, lands that had been restricted solely to 
homesteading for the past ten years under the Southern Homestead 
Act (SHA). In what would prove to be a remarkable 
understatement, Clayton stated that the bill did “not bear on 
its face its full purpose,” nor could it be expected to pass 
“without some explanation.” As the months passed from February 
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to June, that explanation ran a topical gambit including the 
status of timber lands in the South and the nation at large, the 
relationship between virtuous republican citizens and the public 
domain, and the uniformity and equality of the American legal 
system.5
For Clayton, the opening of the public lands of the 
southern states was a simple matter. In an apparent nod to 
consistency and egalitarianism, he argued that there should be 
one law for public lands that applied to all citizens, and the 
Homestead Act of 1862 served such a purpose. Furthermore, the 
Southern Homestead Act discriminated against timber interests. 
He claimed that the prairie states, stretching from the 
Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, clamored for the timber 
of the South. Displaying a depth of understanding of society 
equal to his tenuous grasp of geography, he claimed that the 
Negroes of the South refused to homestead these lands because 
they realized they were farmers, and the land only had value for 
timber. Explaining why they had yet to take advantage of the 
homestead provision, he stated that the former slaves recognized 
their place, both figuratively and literally, and chose to 
remain where they were at the end of the war. Therefore, the 
only result of keeping the SHA in force was the encouragement of 
timber thieves and the restriction of western settlement and the 
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timber industry. In fact, he claimed to not know why Congress 
enacted the restrictions in the first place.6
Although Clayton was forgetful, the institutional memory of 
the Senate remained intact. George Edmunds, Republican Senator 
from Vermont, was present in 1866 when the SHA first passed.  He 
reminded his fellow legislators that the purpose of the bill was 
for the benefit of the recently freed “colored people” and it 
was a “very wise and beneficent measure.” He cautioned that it 
took time to rise from poverty and removing the restrictions now 
would be premature. Once the former slaves had time to amass 
sufficient capital, they would no doubt take advantage of the 
homestead provisions. Furthermore, timber was growing scarcer 
throughout the nation as demand increased.  Therefore, the lands 
would only be more valuable when eventually homesteaded by poor 
southerners.7
Other southern Senators resented their Northern colleagues 
instructing them on the best course for their region’s future.  
Taking a page from Clayton, Lewis Bogy from Missouri also called 
for a single land law for the entire country; furthermore, he 
reasoned that the restrictions stifled immigration to the South.  
Bogy argued that the South needed economic development, and that 
expansion would be fueled by population growth. However, under 
the terms of the SHA, public land could not be purchased.  
Requiring citizens to wait five years to gain title to their 
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estates was unrealistic, especially when that restriction did 
not exist in other states. James Alcorn from Mississippi rebuked 
Edmunds suggestion that repealing the SHA would injure the poor, 
since opening the lands to lumber interests would generate jobs 
in that industry.8
When the debate resumed a week later, Senator George 
Boutwell of Massachusetts made an impassioned plea for the 
future of the nation. He argued that the question of southern 
timber was not a local issue, nor was it a simple matter of 
economics. He feared that the U.S. was traveling a “clear path 
marked by all the effete and extinct nations of the world,” 
namely the “impoverishment of the land” by the destruction of 
the forests. He referenced George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature 
and the work of George Emerson, both of whom had studied the 
issue of deforestation in other countries and concluded that it 
led to the downfall of once great nations. Boutwell could not 
support the repeal and called it “a system of robbery and 
plunder of generations yet to come.”9
As the debate in the Senate reached an end, the refrain for 
unity in the laws of the land carried the day. John Ingalls from 
Kansas recommended the novel twist of taking the provisions of 
the SHA and applying them to the rest of the nation, eliminating 
the pre-emption portion of the General Homestead Act. Samuel 
Maxey, who had fought on the side of the Confederacy, replied 
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that such an action would extend the discriminatory nature of 
the SHA. He rather crassly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
plea that all citizens should be treated equally. Finally, 
Charles James from Florida argued that it has never been the 
policy of the government to restrict the public domain for the 
future and all he wanted was the southern states to be restored 
“on an equality with the other states of the Union.”10 
Congressional delegates from the West praised the value of 
the agrarian ideal for the Republic. Kansan William Brown called 
for the extension of the SHA’s provisions to all the states of 
the Union. He declared that his state offered a fine example of 
the benefits of the homestead principle to the actual settler.  
James McDill of Iowa concurred that there should be only one law 
for all of the public domain, and that it should be the SHA.  He 
disputed the notion that a great supply of good land remained in 
the West, and stated that of the remaining land only five 
percent was suitable for agriculture. Therefore, the government 
should reserve the remaining lands for poor people, as “a land-
holder always makes a good citizen.”11 
The final word in the debate came from a former Confederate 
soldier. Rep. Hernando De Soto Money was a first term 
congressmen from Mississippi who had served throughout the war.  
He objected to his colleagues from other regions suggesting that 
they knew what was best for the South. He stated the “hot temper 
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which followed the war” resulted in the “persecution against the 
white people of these States” brought about by the SHA. All he 
desired was that the southern states “be put on an equal footing 
with the other states.” After all, the South was firmly 
committed to the well being of the “colored man” and there was “ 
as little distress and poverty among the poorer people of the 
Southern States” as anywhere in the Union. Money concluded by 
ridiculing the notion of a “land monopoly” by suggesting that 
you “might as well say that merchants have a monopoly in dealing 
in merchandise or that shoemakers have a monopoly in shoemaking 
as to say that farmers have a monopoly of the land.”12 
The repeal of the Southern Homestead Act became official on 
July 4, 1876. This date is fitting in light of all the 
discussion involving the proper course for the Republic.  During 
the debate, former Confederates wrapped themselves in the cloth 
of republican equality and democratic egalitarianism and called 
for the end of discriminatory statues. A few, more transparent, 
southern congressmen called for the economic growth of the South 
and the industrial development of its coal, iron and especially 
timber resources. All agreed that the SHA deserved revocation.  
Its repeal marked the beginning of the end of Reconstruction and 
the first steps toward the re-integration of the South. The 
congressional debates charted several courses for the nation. 
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The vision of the future that carried the day told of a 
country preoccupied with growth. Some voices called for the 
conservation of the public lands, others for the protection of 
the nation’s timber.  However, these views represented a small 
minority. On the other end of the spectrum, the existence of any 
shortages in either land or timber was flatly denied. The South 
resisted any further attempts by outside interests to dictate 
the conditions of their existence.  The rise of Jim Crow laws 
would soon give the lie to their claims of equality under the 
law, but it was clear that they ready for freedom and liberty to 
profit. For the rest of the country, this appeared to be a 
reasonable request. The end of Reconstruction is not only a 
story of “failed” Republican policies, but also a tale of 
industrial capitalism’s appeal. For many, by 1876, it was time 
to get back to the business of growing America. Economic growth 
appeared to offer the best platform to achieve that elusive 
“equal footing.”   
The yellow pine forests open by the repeal of the Southern 
Homestead Act soon supported settlement on the Great Plains.  
The greatest expansion occurred in the 1890s, but within months 
of the repeal “cruisers” from Great Lakes lumber interests 
combed the region for prime lands. Small speculators arrived 
first, acquiring pine tracts for $1.25 to $3.00 and acre, while 
hardwood lands sold for $5 to $10. Larger holdings were obtained 
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as well; two Michigan lumbermen, Nathan Bradley and C.F. 
Hackley, together claimed over 200,000 acres, for example.13 The 
first yellow pine arrived in Chicago just a year after repeal of 
the Southern Homestead Act, and in over a decade it offered 
Great Lakes white pine stiff competition in Nebraska and 
Kansas.14 Public reaction against the increasing number of 
Northern investors in the South, coupled with fear of the 
“lumber trust,” led Congress to suspend all cash sales except 
for homestead claims in 1888.15 
In that roughly ten-year period, over 5.5 million acres of 
prime Southern timberland was sold, setting the stage for a 
lumber boom. Following close behind, transportation 
infrastructure increased apace. Between 1880 and 1890, the South 
as a whole saw 23 thousand miles of railroad construction, a 
stunning increase over the five thousand miles of the previous 
decade. Cheap labor closed the deal. The average wage in the 
South was $376 per year in 1880, a full thousand dollars less 
than in the Northeast. A transportation system existed, the land 
was acquired easily, and an exploitable and cheap labor force 
stood at the ready all coalescing around 1890.16 
The transformations reached far beyond the timberlands, 
altering the social fabric of the South. The jobs promised from 
the lumber industry did little to help Southern blacks.  
Seasonal and itinerant employment tore at the bonds of families, 
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forcing the men to travel to work in lumber camps, while their 
wives stayed home. Between 1880 and 1915, around a quarter of 
urban and small town black families had only a single parent in 
the home, usually the mother. The forced migrations and apparent 
vagrancy of the men began to draw suspicion from white 
southerners, erupting in violence and lynchings.17 The 
Jeffersonian vision of yeoman farmers may have not lived up to 
its vaulted promise, but the creation of a permanent underclass 
in the South offers a stark contrast to the failures and frauds 
elsewhere. 
Out on the Plains, emerging towns consumed lumber at 
prodigious rates. The image of the sod house retains its appeal 
in the historical imagination, but for many settlers, a frame 
house signified a comfortable existence. Geographer John Hudson 
noted that most towns had two or three lumberyards, and profit 
was nearly ensured in that industry. Although William Cronon and 
others have traced these connections, most of the focus on 
lumbering highlights the decades of the 1870s and 1880s.  
However, the greatest numbers of homestead claims were filed 
after 1890. The yellow pine forests opened by repel of the 
Southern Homestead Act amounted to a giant subsidy for western 
settlement. The profits may have unevenly accrued to a precious 
few, but the increased supply, especially following the decline 
of the Great Lakes industry, helped to keep prices down for the 
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average citizen. When lumber dealers on the Plains did loose 
money, it was due to local competition and not from lack of a 
market.18 
Superficially, the greatest difference between the two 
Homestead Acts was the absence of cash sales in the Southern 
version. Economists Terry Anderson and Peter Hill use the term 
transaction costs to describe “specifying, monitoring, 
enforcing, and trading property rights.” They argue that higher 
transaction costs make it harder for people to gain from the 
trade and more likely that conflict will ensue. The lack of a 
cash purchase option created the highest transaction cost 
possible – requiring five years of toil to achieve title.19 These 
high costs added to the considerable burdens faced by under-
capitalized and mostly illiterate free blacks in the aftermath 
of the Civil War.  
The repeal of the Southern Homestead Act can be viewed as a 
repudiation of the “free land” ideal found in its more famous 
national cousin. Such a conclusion would miss the mark.  Free 
land was a fiction, as the costs of surviving for five years 
waiting to prove a homestead claim were very real. The paltry 
number of claims filed during the decade of the Southern 
Homestead Act makes explicit the chasm between the ideal of free 
land and the ability of the poor to realize that ideal. The 
connections between southern lumber and western homesteading 
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call for further investigation of the impact of Plains 
settlement. The Southern component of this story, its dark 
obverse, deserves further explication. Drawing a straight line 
from the lumber used to build a one-room schoolhouse or a church 
steeple to the social dislocation resulting in violence and 
lynchings may be a stretch, but it is important to recognize the 
hidden costs as well as the transaction costs of homesteading. 
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